The Evil Crow Cable Wind

The Evil Crow Cable Wind — when your charging cable goes rogue (long-form breakdown)

Someone hands you a cable that looks like a perfectly ordinary USB cable. You plug it in to charge your phone or sync a laptop — and the computer suddenly thinks a keyboard just typed a dozen commands by itself. Meet the Evil Crow Cable Wind, a product sold by The Wired Hatters that explicitly markets itself as a wireless “BadUSB” pentest tool: a USB cable with an ESP32-S3 inside, Wi-Fi control, payload storage and a web UI for remote triggering. It’s a compact example of a wider class of devices (USB Rubber Ducky, O.MG Cable, etc.) that demonstrate real, practical risks around how computers trust USB peripherals. The Wired Hatters+2Hak5+2

Below I’ll walk through what the product is, the general techniques behind “bad USB” cables, what attackers (or red teams) can do with them at a high level, real-world examples and risk scenarios, and defensive/opsec advice you can use to reduce exposure — all without providing any instructions that would enable misuse.

I was purchasing some of this devices and I am still learning and experimenting with them. I was writing some time ago a post about bad USB but in this one I will focus on a specific product: The Evil Crow Cable Wind.

What the Evil Crow Cable Wind actually is (short summary)

• A cable (USB-A or USB-C) with an ESP32-S3 microcontroller inside. It advertises a built-in Wi-Fi access point and a web interface for managing payloads.

• Capabilities include keyboard & mouse emulation, remote payload execution, a remote shell (default port 4444), over-the-air firmware updates, multi-platform compatibility (Windows, macOS, Linux) and storage for payloads in flash. The page also notes default Wi-Fi credentials and programmable VID/PID strings. Price: €44.99.

How “BadUSB” cable attacks work — the high level (no how-to)

USB is powerful because it supports multiple device classes (storage, network adapters, keyboards, serial devices, etc.). Operating systems often treat some of those classes — especially Human Interface Devices (HID) like keyboards — as inherently trusted: when a USB device declares itself a keyboard, the OS accepts keystrokes without user confirmation. Attack cables exploit that trust by presenting themselves as HIDs or other benign devices while embedding a microcontroller that can be reprogrammed to send sequences of keystrokes, open shells, mount network interfaces, or otherwise interact with the host. This is the technique popularized by tools such as the USB Rubber Ducky and described since the “BadUSB” disclosures in 2014.

More sophisticated malicious cables can also include a wireless implant so an operator can control them remotely (e.g., O.MG cable-style implants). That combination — HID emulation + remote control + hidden implant — is exactly the threat class products like the Evil Crow Cable Wind are designed to emulate for security testing.

In simple and no technical words, imagine you’re plugging in a cable to charge your phone or connect your laptop. You think it’s just a piece of wire for electricity. But inside some of these special cables is a tiny hidden computer.

When you plug it in:

• Instead of only sending power, the hidden chip inside the cable can pretend to be something else — like a keyboard or a mouse.

• Your computer doesn’t question it. It just thinks, “Okay, a new keyboard is here.”

• That fake “keyboard” can then start typing commands really fast, much faster than any human.

• Those commands could, for example, open windows, change settings, download files, or send information out without you touching a key.

Some advanced versions (like Evil Crow Cable Wind) even let someone control the cable wirelessly over Wi-Fi. That means a hacker nearby could tell the cable when to start “typing” — all while it still looks like an innocent charging cord.

It’s like you let a friend borrow your house keys. You think they only open the front door. But secretly, those keys can also move the furniture around inside the house whenever they want — and you wouldn’t notice until it’s too late.

Why it matters

• These cables look completely normal.

• If you don’t know where a cable came from, it could be dangerous.

• That’s why security experts say: use only your own trusted cables, especially for work or sensitive devices.

What attackers can (in general) achieve with this class of device

At a conceptual level, a malicious or attacker-controlled cable can enable:

• Keystroke injection — automatic commands typed into a machine as if a keyboard were used. This can open terminals, run commands, download tools, create accounts, or exfiltrate data — but I won’t list exact command sequences. Hak5

• Remote shells / beaconing — if the cable implants networking capability or opens a shell back to an operator, an attacker can control a machine remotely through that channel. The Evil Crow Cable page explicitly references remote shell functionality (port 4444 default). The Wired Hatters

• Credential scraping / data exfiltration — scripts can automate the extraction of local files, tokens or saved credentials and copy them to attacker-controlled locations.

• Persistence & stealth — firmware-level implants can persist beyond OS reinstallation if not detected and can appear as ordinary peripherals (BadUSB research showed firmware attacks can be difficult to detect). WIRED+1

These are real capabilities exploited in red-team exercises and by malicious actors. Vendors of defensive tools have even created detectors that analyze cable behavior for signs of implants because the threat is practical enough to warrant hardware detection.

Example scenarios (high-level, for awareness)

1. Conference / public charging: an attacker leaves a “charging” cable in a public area. Someone borrows it, plugs into a laptop and the cable enumerates as a keyboard and runs a payload that attempts to harvest data or open a remote backchannel. (This is a commonly-discussed use case for malicious cables.)

2. Supply-chain or gifting: an attacker ships a cable to a specific person or brandishes it as a “gift” — the cable later provides covert access when used. Historically, supply-chain implants have been a concern in hardware security conversations.

3. Targeted physical attack on a workstation: with short physical access, an attacker plugs in a malicious cable and uses HID emulation to install a persistent backdoor or exfiltrate credentials (red teams simulate this to test detection and response).

Defensive recommendations & OPSEC (what organizations and individuals should do)

If you want to reduce your risk from malicious cables and BadUSB-style attacks, here are practical, non-technical steps and policies (no step-by-step attack instructions):

• Don’t use random or unverified cables — treat cables and chargers you didn’t buy yourself like you would any unknown storage device: avoid plugging them into corporate machines or devices containing sensitive data. Purchase from reputable vendors and maintain an inventory of issued cables.

• Use charge-only cables or data-blocking adapters when charging in public spaces. These physically break the data lines and allow only power. They’re a simple, effective mitigation for casual exposure.

• Harden USB policy — organizations should implement endpoint controls that restrict what USB devices can do (device whitelisting, kernel policies, and endpoint detection). Use least privilege: don’t run as admin for daily work if not required.

• Treat HID events with suspicion — sudden unexpected prompts, UAC dialogs or automated windows that appear when a new USB device is connected should be treated as suspicious and investigated.

• Segment sensitive systems — keep high-value assets off networks and machines used for general browsing/USB use; dedicated devices reduce attack surface.

• Hardware detection tools — for high-security environments, specialized detectors and lab equipment can analyze USB cable behavior and identify implants (some vendors sell malicious cable detectors).

• Training & red teams — run controlled exercises to test user behavior and detection capability. These exercises should be legal, documented, and run with sign-offs.

• Firmware & device supply security — favor devices and peripherals from vendors that sign firmware or use secure update mechanisms; verify vendor security practices.

Bottom line

• The Evil Crow Cable Wind is a modern, affordable entrant in a long line of dual-use USB tools that combine HID emulation with wireless control — useful for red teams, and potentially dangerous if misused. The Wired Hatters+1

• The underlying class of vulnerability (BadUSB / HID injection) has been known and discussed since 2014; defenses exist but require policy, training and sometimes hardware detection to be effective. WIRED+1

• If you’re responsible for security, treat unknown cables like unknown drives: don’t plug them in, enforce policies, train staff, and consider technical controls (charge-only cables, endpoint policies, detection).

This cable comes in two variants: one USB-A to USB-C, and one with USB-C to USB-C. A tiny circuit board containing an ESP32-S3 hides inside a USB-C plug on each cable, and can carry out a keystroke injection attack. The cable’s firmware is open-source, and has an impressive set of features: a payload syntax checker, payload autocompletion, OS detection, and the ability to impersonate the USB device of your choice.

The cable provides a control interface over WiFi, and it’s possible to edit and deploy live payloads without physical access to the cable (this is where the syntax checker should be particularly useful). The firmware also provides a remote shell for computers without a network connection; the cable opens a shell on the target computer which routes commands and responses through the cable’s WiFi connection (demonstrated in the video below).

The main advantage of the Evil Crow Cable Wind is its price, at which point you can afford to lose a few during deployment. We’ve previously seen a malicious cable once before. Of course, these attacks aren’t limited to cables and USB drives; we’ve seen them in USB-C docks, in a gaming mouse, and the fear of them in fans.

Soon I will come with a technical and step by step guide about this device.

Stay safe all!

⚠️ WARNING ⚠️This hardware is for educational and experimental purposes only and is not meant for any illegal activity or purposes.I do not condone illegal activity and strongly encourage keeping transmissions to legal or valid educational or experimental uses allowed by law.